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Abstract
According to quantum mechanics, statements about the future
made by sentient beings like us are, in general, neither true nor false;
they must satisfy a many-valued logic. I propose that the truth value
of such a statement should be identified with the probability that the
event it describes will occur. After reviewing the history of related
ideas in logic, I argue that it gives an understanding of probability
which is particularly satisfactory for use in quantum mechanics. I
construct a lattice of future-tense propositions, with truth values in
the interval [0, 1], and derive logical properties of these truth values
given by the usual quantum-mechanical formula for the probability of
a history.
1 Introduction
The subject of this paper is the logic governing the expressions of present
experience, past memory and future expectations of a subject, regarded as
a sentient and articulate physical system and therefore governed by the laws
of physics in the framework of quantum theory. Since the expressions to be
considered refer to the past, present and future of the subject, they must
be governed by some form of temporal logic, such as is found in the work
of Arthur Prior and his followers. Quantum theory being an indeterministic
∗Expanded version of a talk given at the Arthur Prior Centenary Conference, Oxford,
in September 2014
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theory, the problem of future contingents is particularly relevant. In order
to incorporate indeterminism in statements in the future tense, the temporal
logic proposed here, differing from Prior’s, has truth values which are not
bivalent but take real values between 0 and 1 (inclusive) — the truth of a
future-tense statement is identified with the probability that it will turn out
to be true. Maybe this thesis will be of interest to philosophers of probability
and philosophers of quantum mechanics as well as temporal logicians.
Classically, it would be natural to take the past and present as definite:
statements in the present and past tenses have truth values 0 or 1. For a
apeaker governed by quantum theory, it is not clear that this can be in-
corporated in the framework suggested here without modification. This is
currently being investigated. The present paper, therefore, is restricted to
the study of the present and future tenses.
The paper is organised as follows. In section 2 I outline the physical
framework being used, that of quantum mechanics, and define the propo-
sitions in question: statements about the present and future experiences of
the speaker, regarded as a physical system in a world governed by quantum
mechanics. This requires a distinction between external statements about
the physical world, made from a standpoint outside the world, and internal
statements made by a speaker in the world; it is the latter that are discussed
here. I argue that the superposition principle of quantum mechanics makes
it impossible, in general, for such future-tense propositions to be either defi-
nitely true or definitely false, and I introduce my main proposal concerning
the relation between probabiliy and the truth values of future-tense proposi-
tions in a many-valued logic.
In the next section I acknowledge some of the problems with this idea,
and attempt to trace the idea, and reactions to these problems, in previous
writers. In the following section the focus shifts to the other side of the equa-
tion, from truth values to probability; I argue that this concept of probability
is especially well suited to use in quantum mechanics. In particular, it allows
the laws of motion of quantum mechanics (from the internal perspective)
to be expressed as an indeterministic theory in continuous time, unlike the
conventional postulates on the results of experiments.
In Section 5 I examine the logical properties of the temporal logic as it
might apply to the utterances of a speaker satisfying the laws of quantum
mechanics. The logical system consists of a lattice T of tensed propositions
with truth values in the interval [0, 1] of real numbers. The lattice T is
constructed from a tenseless lattice E containing propositions about the ex-
periences of a particular sentient system; the elements of T are elements of E ,
each associated with a time, and elements constructed from them by opera-
tions ∧,∨ and ¬ which are assumed to satisfy the same rules as conjunction,
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disjunction and negation. A further assumption on the tense operators (that
they respect the logical operations in the tenseless lattice E) leads to the
characterisation of the elements of the lattice T as disjunctions of histories :
conjunctions of statements of experience at different times.
An assignment of truth values to the elements of T is defined to be a
function from T to real numbers which takes the value 0 or 1 on present
and past propositions, but can take any value between 0 and 1 for future
propositions. The bulk of this section is devoted to exploring the logical
properties of the assignments of truth values to future-tense propositions
which are obtained from the quantum-mechanical formula for the probability
of a single history; the truth value of a disjunction of histories is defined by
means of the formula
τ(p ∨ q) = τ(p) + τ(q)− τ(p ∧ q)
which would be expected for probabililties. It has to be shown that this
gives values between 0 and 1, and that it is consistent to apply it for all
elements p, q of the lattice T . This is the content of Theorem 11, to which
the preceding chain of theorems has been leading. The usual truth tables
for ∧ and ∨ would follow from this if truth values were restricted to 0 and
1, but in general the usual relation between the truth value of a compound
proposition and the truth values of its components is weakened; the extent
of this weakening is laid out in Theorem 14. This is followed by a discussion
of whether the connective ∨ in this logic can legitimately be regarded as a
generalised form of “or” for future-tense statements.
Finally, in Section 6 I take a critical look at the theory adumbrated here
and try to assess its relevance to different forms of indeterministic physi-
cal theory. I claim that it is the appropriate logic for a classical theory of
an open future, and for a quantum theory applied to a world in which a
mechanism of decoherence operates, as it does in the world1 we live in. The
section concludes with a discussion of weaknesses in this proposal and possi-
ble alternative formulations. The results of the paper are summarised in the
concluding Section 7.
1Here, and elsewhere, I use the word “world” in its usual sense, or in the Wittgen-
steinian sense: “everything that is the case”. No reference is intended to the “worlds” of
the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics.
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2 Outline of Quantum Theory
2.1 Living in the Quantum World
Quantum mechanics boasts a simple, well-defined mathematical formalism
and an unprecedentedly successful record of calculation and prediction in
physical applications. Following Schro¨dinger [26], Everett [7] and Wheeler
[33], I assume that everything in the mathematical formalism can be taken
as a true description of the universe, and that no extra apparatus is needed
to relate this description to what we measure and observe.
The clean mathematical formalism, in its nonrelativistic form, offers a
single mathematical object |Ψ(t)〉 to describe whatever physical system we
are interested in — ultimately the whole universe U . This object is a vector in
a Hilbert space HU (the marks |〉 in the symbol indicate the vector nature of
|Ψ〉), varying with time t in accordance with a first-order differential equation
(the Schro¨dinger equation). It follows that if the value of |Ψ(t)〉 is known at
some one time, its value at all other times is determined.
This paper is concerned with the experiences and utterances of a sentient
being S (which could be you or me) regarded as a physical system in the
universe. As such, S has states which are described by the elements of
a Hilbert space HS. The states of the rest of the universe (which I will
sometimes call “the outside world”) are described by the elements of a Hilbert
space HU ′ , and the state space HU of the whole universe is the tensor product
HU = HS ⊗HU ′.
Among the states2 in HS are those in which the sentient being S is hav-
ing a definite experience which it can describe by present-tense propositions.
It is probably true [31] of the brain states of human beings that these ex-
perience states have definite values of various physiological and neurological
quantities, and I will take this as part of the definition of a sentient physical
system. According to quantum mechanics, then, the states of definite experi-
ence are eigenvectors of the corresponding experience operators. The full set
of eigenvectors of these operators is a basis for the Hilbert space HS which
I will call the experience basis, although it will also include many vectors
which do not correspond to experiences (or even to anything which looks like
a sentient animal).
I will denote the experiences of S by ηi, pretending for notational con-
venience that they are countable, and the corresponding elements of the
2From now on, I will no longer be careful to distinguish between a state of a physical
system and the vector in its Hilbert space which describes that state.
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experience basis by |ηi〉; abusing notation slightly, I will use the same symbol
for a general element of the experience basis.
Similarly, among the states of the whole universe are tensor products3
|Ψ〉 = |η〉|ψ′〉, in which |η〉 ∈ HS is an experience state and |ψ
′〉 is a state of
the rest of the universe which conforms to the experience η in the sense that
if η includes the experience of seeing, for example, a tiger about to pounce,
then |ψ′〉 is a state of the outside world including a tiger about to pounce.
Such product states are understandable; this is what we expect the sentient
system and the outside world, together, to be like.
But according to quantum theory, the laws of physics, in the form of the
Schro¨dinger equation, will often cause such a product state of the universe
to change into a less understandable state
|Ψ〉 =
∑
i
|ηi〉|ψ
′
i〉 (1)
in which a number of different experience states enter, each associated with
a different state of the outside world. In such a state the sentient system is
entangled with the outside world, and has no definite, unique experience. Eq.
(1) is the form of the most general state of the universe; since the experiences
states |ηi〉 form a basis for HS, any vector in HS⊗HU ′ can be written in this
form. To take account of changes in time, we should write this as
|Ψ(t)〉 =
∑
i
|ηi〉|ψ
′
i(t)〉 (2)
in which the experience states |ηi〉 are independent of time, being a fixed
basis of HS, and the states of the external world, |ψ
′
i〉, are time-varying
vector coefficients with respect to this basis.
There are two ways of approaching this strange equation without doing
violence to the laws of physics as encapsulated in the Schro¨dinger equation.
Both originate in Hugh Everett’s work in the 1950s, and are expressed in the
titles of his PhD thesis and his only published paper in physics. The title
of his thesis is “The theory of the universal wave function”, which expresses
his main motivation: the idea that quantum mechanics, as expressed in (2),
should be taken seriously and literally: however hard to understand, this is a
statement of fact about the whole universe. (Schro¨dinger also expressed this
idea in unpublished lectures in the early 1950s [26]. The title of Everett’s
paper is ‘ “Relative state” formulation of quantum mechanics’, which empha-
sises another way of understanding (2): any statement about the external
3In this notation, due to Dirac, juxtaposition of vector symbols |〉 denotes the tensor
product of vectors.
5
world made by an observer must be understood as being relative to a partic-
ular state of that observer: if, for any reason, we are entitled to say that the
state of the observer at time t is |ηn〉, then we are entitled to assert that the
state of the rest of the universe is |ψ′n(t)〉. And, of course, as an observer I
am entitled to say which |ηn〉 is my experience state, precisely because it is
my experience.
These two assertions about the state of the universe appear to be in
contradiction. One of them asserts that the truth about the universe at
time t is given by the whole state (2); the other that it is given by one of
the components |ηi〉|ψ
′
i(t)〉. I now want to argue that they are, nevertheless,
compatible, once it is recognised that they belong in different perspectives.
2.2 Internal and external
This contradiction is of the same type as many familiar contradictions be-
tween objective and subjective statements. It can be resolved in the way
put forward by Thomas Nagel [19, 20]: we must recognise that there are two
positions from which we can make statements of fact or value, and state-
ments made in these two contexts are not commensurable. In the external
context (the God’s-eye view, or the “view from nowhere”) we step outside
our own particular situation and talk about the whole universe. In the inter-
nal context (the view from now here), we make statements as agents inside
the universe. Thus in the external view, |Ψ(t)〉 is the whole truth about
the universe; the components |ηi〉|ψ
′
i(t)〉 are (unequal) parts of this truth.
But in the internal view, from the perspective of some particular experience
state |ηi〉, the component |ηi〉|ψ
′
i(t)〉 is the actual truth. I may know what
the other components |ηj〉|ψ
′
j(t)〉 are, because I can calculate |Ψ(t)〉 from the
Schro¨dinger equation; but these other components, for me, represent things
that might have happened but didn’t. From the external perspective the
universal state vector |Ψ(t)〉 is a true description of the world at time t, and
each component |ηj〉|ψ
′
j(t)〉 is just part of that description; from the internal
perspective of the experience state |ηi〉 at time t, the state vector |ηi〉|ψ
′
i(t)〉 is
a true and complete description of the world, and the universal state vector
|Ψ(t)〉 is not a description of the world but a true statement of how the world
might change.
2.3 Time and chance
Two questions present themselves. First, time: if it is unproblematic that at
time t I can identify my experience |ηi〉 and the corresponding state |ψ
′
i(t)〉
of the rest of the universe, what can I say about other times? For past
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times, memory might be expected to provide an answer: it seems that we
are constructed in such a way that each experience state |ηn〉 that actually
occurs at time t (i.e. for which |ψ′n(t)〉 is non-zero) contains information
about a unique experience state at each time before t. However, quantum
mechanics apparently does not allow such a simple model of memory, for
reasons related to the “watched-pot effect” [18, 27]. For this reason I will
only treat present and future tenses in this paper, and leave the past tense
for future work.
In general, for a being having a definite experience ηi at time t, there is
nothing in the physics to pick out the experience that the being will have at
some future time t′: there is no “thin red line” stretching into the future; no
fact of the matter, even relative to the experience η, about what the subject’s
experience will be at time t′.4 The Schro¨dinger equation can be applied to
|ηi〉|ψ
′
i(t)〉 to yield a state vector e
−iH(t′−t)/ℏ
(
|ηi〉|ψ
′
i(t)〉
)
to which it will evolve
at a given future time t′; but in general this will not be another product state
in which the subject has a definite experience, but a superposition of such
states in which the subject is entangled with the outside world.
Second, probability: quantum mechanics is an indeterministic theory,
describing chance events. Its empirical success rests on its ability to give
probabilities for such events. But how can there be any place for probability
in the framework I have described? In the external view, |Ψ(t)〉 develops
deterministically according to the Schro¨dinger equation; nothing is left to
chance. In the internal view, as we have just seen, there are no definite
future events and therefore, it seems, no chances. How can “the probability
that my experience will be ηj tomorrow” mean anything if “my experience
will be ηj tomorrow” has no meaning?
2.4 Probability and truth
My answer to these two questions is to propose that they answer each other.
If there is no experience that can be identified as the experience I will have
at a future time t′, then for each η the statement “I will experience η at t′”
is not true. Nevertheless, if that experience is very likely then this statement
is nearly true; in other words, it has a degree of truth less than, but close
4It might seem hard to abandon the assumption, by which we seem to live our lives,
that there is something that is going to happen tomorrow, whether or not it is determined
by the laws of physics; this might look like just another unacceptable example of scientists
dismissing as an illusion a perception which is too immediate to be deniable (like con-
sciousness or free will). However, it has been argued ([30], [32] p. 274) that the openness
of the future accords better with our pre-scientific intuition than the existence of a definite
future.
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to, 1. This leads to the suggestion that the probability of a future event E
should be identified as the degree of truth of the future-tense statement “E
will occur”.
This argument reflects the way that probabilities are calculated in quan-
tum mechanics. The vector e−iH(t
′−t)/ℏ
(
|ηi〉|ψ
′
i(t)〉
)
to which an experience
eigenvector |ηi〉|ψ
′
i(t)〉 evolves from time t to time t
′, following the Schro¨dinger
equation, will not in general be an experience eigenvector; but it may be near
an experience eigenvector, and the nearness is measured by a number (close
to 1 if the vectors are near to each other) which, in conventional quantum
mechanics, is identified (according to the “Born rule”) with a probability .
What exactly is a “degree of truth” for a future-tense statement? In the
rest of the paper I will explore the possibility that it can be taken to be a
truth value in a temporal logic.
3 Truth values as probabilities
3.1 Problems
1. One function of truth values is to define the meaning of logical connectives
such as and and or by means of truth tables. The existence of such tables
is made a prerequisite for many-valued logics in Gottwald’s comprehensive
treatise [10]. This is not possible with probabilities. Using τ to denote
the probability of a proposition, the values of τ(p ∧ q) and τ(p ∨ q) are not
determined as functions of τ(p) and τ(q); the two equations which this would
require are replaced by a single relation
τ(p ∧ q) + τ(p ∨ q) = τ(p) + τ(q) (3)
with inequalities
0 ≤ τ(p ∧ q) ≤ min{τ(p), τ(q)}, (4)
max{τ(p), τ(q)} ≤ τ(p ∨ q) ≤ 1. (5)
2. Another use of truth values is to identify logical tautologies, which are
defined as formulae, with propositional variables, which have truth value 1 for
all assignments of truth values to the variables. If truth values were replaced
in this definition by probabilities satisfying (3), it would not yield a useful
set of tautologies. Instead, the usual procedure in probability logic [1] is to
require that the value of probability should be 1 for all logical tautologies,
assuming that these have already been identified.
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3.2 History
Aristotle’s discussion of future contingents in De Interpretatione is often
taken to support a three-valued logic for statements about the future. But
Aristotle says more than denying truth or falsity to “There will be a sea-battle
tomorrow”; he also notes that it may be more or less likely that there will
be a sea-battle. Thus if there is a case for regarding Aristotle as a proponent
of many-valued logic for future-tense statements, there might also be a case
that he would regard the appropriate truth values as probabilities.
 Lukasiewicz’s first system of many-valued logic [16] had truth values re-
lated to probabilities, though of a rather different kind from those considered
here (he was concerned with propositions containing variables, giving them
truth values equal to the proportion of values of the variable which made
the proposition true). Later [17] he was motivated by the problem of future
contingents and expressed a preference for many-valued logic in which the
truth values could be any real number between 0 and 1; he asked how this
was related to probability theory. In his system the truth values do not sat-
isfy (3), but they satisfy (4) with inequality replaced by equality, so that the
logical connectives are truth-functional.
The failure of probabilities to be truth-functional led to a reluctance
among logicians to accept them as truth values, but this view was defended
by Reichenbach [22] (though his frequentist conception of probability was dif-
ferent from that espoused here) and especially by Rescher [23]. Both these
authors claimed to prove that the tautologies of ordinary two-valued logic
can all be obtained as tautologies of probability logic, but Reichenbach’s
argument depended on his frequentism and Rescher’s, though more formal,
required axioms which themselves refer to the classical tautologies, giving his
argument an element of circularity.
In a discussion of time, quantum mechanics and probability, Saunders
[25] puts forward a view of time and probability similar to that of this paper:
“events in the future . . . are indeterminate; . . . probabilities . . . express the
degrees of this indeterminacy” (emphasis in the original). The identifica-
tion of probabilities with truth values of future-tense propositions has been
developed by Pykacz ([2] and references therein), who applies this idea to
quantum mechanics and uses it to throw interesting light on the GHZ para-
dox. Pykacz’s many-valued logic, however, is different from the one developed
here.
The notion of degrees of truth also occurs in fuzzy logic [34, 6, 24], and in
this context also Edgington proposed replacing the classical truth tables by
the relation (3). More complicated truth values occur in topos theory [15],
which has been proposed as a suitable logical formalism for the foundations
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of physics by Isham [13] and for the discussion of partial truth by Butter-
field [3]. Do¨ring and Isham have identified probabilities with truth values
in topos theory [4], but the probabilities they discuss seem to be credences
rather than chances, occurring in both classical and quantum physics but,
in the latter, relevant to mixed states and not to pure states. Isham has
also formulated a temporal form of quantum logic [12] in which histories are
treated as propositions.
4 Probabilities as truth values
In the previous section the focus was on the truth values of future-tense
propositions; it was argued that in a world governed by quantum mechanics,
such truth values should be equated with probabilities. In this section I will
examine the other side of this equation, and argue that the most appropriate
understanding of probability in quantum mechanics is that it is a truth value
of a future-tense proposition — or at least that such an understanding is as
good as any other.
There are several different concepts that go under the name of “probabil-
ity” (or, if you think that it is a single concept, several theories of probability)
([9], [32] part II). Probability can be a frequency, or proportion, of favourable
instances among all relevant instances; the probability of a proposition can
be a logical property (“degree of entailment”) of a proposition relative to
another proposition; the probability of an event can be a subjective concept,
the degree of belief of a particular person, measured by the betting odds on
the occurrence of the event that are acceptable to that person; relatedly, it
can be a guide to action for a person; or it can be an objective property, the
propensity of a physical set-up to produce the event.
All of these have been put forward as appropriate ways to understand the
concept of probability in physics. Frequentist theories, with their apparent
no-nonsense relation to empirical data, are attractive to physicists, but it is
difficult to make them coherent and non-circular [32]. Classical deterministic
physics has a place for probability in situations of incomplete knowledge,
which is similar to logical probabiilty; some theories, following the lead of
David Bohm [5], hold that probability in quantum mechanics arises in the
same way. However, such theories, known as “hidden variable” theories, are
generally regarded as having no empirical support.
The subjective concept of “degree of belief” is held to provide the mean-
ing of all statements of quantum mechanics by one school of physicists, the
quantum Bayesians or “QBists” [8], but even the apparently opposite camp
of Everettians, who believe in the objective truth of a wave function of the
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universe, appeal to an agent’s degree of belief, manifested in their acceptance
of betting odds, to give meaning to probabiliity. Thus Wallace ([32] p. 122)
treats probability as “definitionally linked to rational decision-making” (my
emphasis).
Many, however, would reject this subjectivist approach as abandoning the
scientific ideal of an objective theory. It might seem that this is the appro-
priate concept in the context of this paper, based as it is on the experience
of an individual subject and their internal statements about the world. How-
ever, “internal” is not the same as “subjective”; the sentient being of this
paper can aspire to statements which are objectively true in the experience
state in which they find themselves. The criterion for success in the quest for
objectivity, in this internal context, is the same as in any other view of the
world: I am reassured that my statement is objective if others with whom I
am in communication agree with me.
Apart from the Bohmians, all schools of thought regard probability in
quantum mechanics as dealing with the outcomes of human actions. Text-
books, following Bohr and Heisenberg in what is known as the “Copenhagen
interpretation”, still give probabilities only for the results of experiments or
for the values of physical quantities found in a measurement; Wallace, for
Everettians, considers the decisions of an agent and bases his proof of the
Born rule on the choices of this agent between different actions; Fuchs et al.,
for QBists, consider probabilities to be our beliefs about the response of the
world to our interventions in it.
But consider my situation. I have retired, and I am very lazy. I spend my
days sitting in my garden reading newspapers and watching my grandchildren
grow up. I don’t do anything, but I’m interested in what’s happening, what
has happened and what is going to happen. I know what I experience now;
I have an excellent memory, and I know what I experienced at all times in
the past, or at least at a cloely-packed series of times in an open interval
extending up to the present. From these experiences I infer some of what
has happened elsewhere in the wider world. But I don’t know what will
happen in the future. I need some kind of theory to tell me, but our best
theory, quantum mechanics, offers me no certainty. OK, what is likely to
happen in the future? This does not mean “What do I happen to believe
about the future?” I have no beliefs about the future, I simply have no idea
what is likely to happen; I depend on physics to tell me.
I do no experiments, make no measurements; according to the Copen-
hagen interpretation, quantum mechanics will give me no probabilities. I
take no action, make no decisions; decision theory is irrelevant to me. I am
not a gambler, I never place a bet; I am not interested in the guide to action
that Wallace offers me as probabilities, and anyway, because I take no action
11
I do not satisfy the axioms from which he derives those probabilities. Does
this mean that probability is meaningless for me? No: I am curious about
the future, I want to know what could possibly happen and how likely the
different possibilities are. Moreover, I want to know about all times in my
future, not just the times when someone somewhere takes it into their head
to make a measurement.
What could “probability” mean for a passive observer like me? That is
the question to which this paper proposes an answer: there is such a thing
as objective probability, or chance; it applies only to future events, and it
consists of the truth value of the statement that such an event will occur.
This is not just a matter of the idle curiosity of old codgers sitting in
their gardens. Passive observation, as opposed to active experimentation,
is an important element in scientific practice, giving quantitative empirical
data which need theoretical calculation — for example, the time of decay
of an unstable system. Such calculations are performed, of course, but they
do not have a secure basis, firmly grounded in a well-defined theory [28];
the theoretical description of a measurement of time of decay [27] has a
somewhat uncertain connection to the textbook axioms governing the results
of experiments in quantum mechanics. A theory of probabilities as truth
values, which can be applied to a continuous range of times, allows a tighter
treatment of decay problems from first principles. This will be elaborated
elsewhere.
Although quantum theory introduced indeterminism at a fundamental
level in physical science, the form of the theory obscures this. The only
clear, well-defined law of time evolution in conventional quantum mechanics
is the Schro¨dinger equation, which is deterministic: it is a mathematical
procedure which takes as input a mathematical description of the state of a
physical system at time t0 and produces as output a mathematical description
of a single state of the system at a later time t. One would expect an
indeterministic theory to take the same input and produce as output a set
of possible states at the later time t and a probability distribution over this
set. Text-book quantum mechanics does not do this; but it is exactly what
is provided in the internal perspective described here.
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5 The logic of tensed propositions in our
quantum world
5.1 The lattice of propositions
Living in the quantum world, as we do and as we are described in section
2.1, what can we say about it? Statements about our possible experiences
form a Boolean lattice related to the experience state vectors |ηi〉. In the
fiction that there is a countable basis |ηi〉, reports of the experiences ηi are
atoms in this lattice; more generally, it is a Boolean sublattice E of the
lattice of closed subspaces of the Hilbert space HS. To form the lattice T
of statements that we want to make about our experience we need maps
N : E → T (to give statements about our present experience), Pt : E → T
for each positive real number t (to give statements about our experience a
time t in the past) and Ft : E → T (for the future). The complete lattice T
is then generated by the images N(E), Pt(E) and Ft(E). This lattice consists
of statements that we make, and should conform to the structure of our
language; I therefore assume that the lattice has a classical structure, and in
particular that ∧ distributes over ∨. (The non-classical features will enter
when we consider the relation of this lattice to the physical world, given by
truth values — “everything that is the case”). The map N simply embeds
the lattice E into T — it adds the word “now” to a report of an experience
— and therefore respects the structure of these reports, so N is an injective
lattice homomorphism. Since we are assuming that memory gives reports
of past experience with the same quality of definite truth or falsehood as
present experiences, I also take the maps Pt to be injective homomorphisms.
It is not so clear that the future operators Ft should be homomorphisms,
but it is not clear what “and” and “or” should mean for tensed statements
with truth values between 0 and 1. I will assume that each Ft is a homomor-
phism in order to give a meaning to p∧ q and p∨ q for all tensed statements
p and q, but these meanings might be different from “p and q” and “p or q”.
This is discussed further at the end of this section. A major objective of the
mathematical development in this section is to delineate the differences be-
tween ∧ and “and”, and between ∨ and “or”; this is the content of Theorem
14.
On the assumption that T is a distributive lattice, it follows that every
proposition in T is a disjunction of histories hP ∧ h0 ∧ hF where
h0 = N(Π0), hF = Ft1(Π1) ∧ . . . ∧ Ftn(Πn) with 0 < t1 < · · · < tn, (6)
and hP is formed similarly with past operators Pt. Here each Πk represents an
element of the lattice of subspaces E , being the linear operator of orthogonal
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projection onto the subspace. I will refer to n as the length of the history
hF. Since the departures from classical logic in this system occur only in
future-tense propositions, the rest of this section will be concerned only with
the sublattice TF generated by Ft(E) for all t.
5.2 The truth of histories: Conjunction
Truth values are assigned to elements of T from the perspective of a particular
experience η0 at a time t0. Past and present propositions are taken to obey
classical logic, so any element N(Π) or Pt(Π) has a truth value of 0 or 1, and
elements of the sublattice generated by these have truth values determined
by the usual truth tables.
The truth value of a future proposition Ft(Π), however, is equated with
its probability and could lie anywhere in the closed unit interval [0, 1]. It
is determined by quantum mechanics as follows. The component of the
universal state vector determined by the experience |η0〉 at the time t0 is
|E0〉 = |η0〉|ψ
′
0(t0)〉, which would evolve by the Schro¨dinger equation to
e−iHt/ℏ|E0〉 after a time interval t, where H is the universal Hamiltonian.
On the other hand, the experience state |ηj〉 will, after the lapse of time t,
be associated with the component
|ηj〉|ψ
′
j(t0 + t)〉 = (Πj ⊗ 1)|Ψ(t0 + t)〉 = (Πj ⊗ 1)e
−iHt/ℏ|E0〉
of the universal state vector. The geometrical measure of the closeness of
these two vectors is taken to be the truth value of the statement “I will have
experience ηj after a time t” in the context of experience η0 at time t0 (from
now on this context will be understood):
τ (Ft(Πj)) =
∣∣∣〈E0|Π˜j|E0〉∣∣∣2 (7)
where τ denotes truth value and
Π˜j = e
iHt/ℏ(Πj ⊗ 1)e
−iHt/ℏ.
Eq. (7) is the usual expression (the Born rule) for the probability in quantum
mechanics.
To extend this to a conjunction of future-tense propositions, i.e. to a
history hF given by (6), we adopt the standard extension of the Born rule
[11, 32] to the probability of a history hF = Ft1(Π1) ∧ . . . ∧ Ftn(Πn):
τ(hF) = 〈E0|Π˜1 . . . Π˜n−1Π˜nΠ˜n−1 . . . Π˜1|E0〉 (8)
= 〈E0|ChC
†
h|E0〉
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where Ch is the history operator
Ch = Π˜1 · · · Π˜n. (9)
Note that if t1 = t2,
τ(h1 ∧ h2) = 〈E0|Π˜1Π˜2|E0〉 = 〈E0|Π˜
2
1Π˜2|E0〉 = 〈E0|Π˜1Π˜2Π˜1|E0〉
since the projectors Π1 and Π2 commute and therefore so do Π˜1 and Π˜2 if
t1 = t2. So the formula (8) for τ(h1 ∧ h2) holds for t1 = t2 as well as t1 < t2.
I will now explore the logical properties of this definition. First we note
the elementary fact
Lemma 1. Let Π be a projection operator and |ψ〉 any state vector. Then
(i) 0 ≤ 〈ψ|Π|ψ〉 ≤ 〈ψ|ψ〉,
(ii) 〈ψ|Π|ψ〉 = 1 ⇐⇒ Π|ψ〉 = |ψ〉.
Proof.
〈ψ|ψ〉 − 〈ψ|Π|ψ〉 = 〈ψ|(1−Π)|ψ〉 = 〈ψ|(1− Π)2|ψ〉 ≥ 0,
with equality if and only if Π|ψ〉 = |ψ〉.
Theorem 1. For any future history hF,
0 ≤ τ(hF) ≤ 1.
Proof. By repeated application of Lemma 1(i), using 〈E0|E0〉 = 1.
Theorem 2. For any two future histories h1, h2,
τ(h1 ∧ h2) = 1 ⇐⇒ τ(h1) = τ(h2) = 1.
Proof. First note that if k1, . . . kn are one-time histories kn = Ftn(Πn) with
t1 ≤ · · · ≤ tn,
τ(k1 ∧ . . . ∧ kn) = 1 ⇐⇒ τ(k1) = · · · = τ(kn).
This is proved by induction on n, using Lemma 1(ii). Now if h1 and h2 are
any two future histories, τ(h1 ∧ h2), τ(h1) and τ(h2) are all conjunctions
of one-time histories, so both sides of the equivalence in the theorem are
equivalent to τ(k) = 1 for all one-time histories occurring in h1 and h2.
Corollary τ(h1 ∧ h2) 6= 1 =⇒ τ(h1) 6= 1 or τ(h2) 6= 1.
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Theorem 3. For one-time histories h1, h2 with t1 < t2,
τ(h1) = 0 =⇒ τ(h1 ∧ h2) = 0.
Proof.
τ(h1) = 0 =⇒ Π˜1|E0〉 = 0 =⇒ τ(h1 ∧ h2) = 0.
Theorem 4. For one-time histories h1, h2 with t1 < t2,
τ(h1 ∧ h2) + τ(h1 ∧ ¬h2) = τ(h1)
Proof.
τ(h1 ∧ h2) + τ(h1 ∧ ¬h2) = 〈E0|Π˜1Π˜2Π˜1|E0〉+ 〈E0|Π˜1
(
1− Π˜2
)
Π˜1|E0〉
= 〈E0|Π˜1|E0〉 = τ(h1).
Corollary τ(h1 ∧ h2) ≤ τ(h1).
Theorems 2, 3 and 4 show that the truth values of two-time histories
(conjunctions of one-time propositions) have some of the properties that we
would expect for the truth and falsity of conjunction. However, the strict
falsity of a conjunction (as opposed to its lack of truth) does not imply the
strict falsity of one of the conjuncts. This is not surprising, given the prob-
abilistic nature of the truth values. The quantum nature of the truth values
becomes apparent in Theorems 3 and 4 which display a lack of symmetry
between the conjuncts. The falsity of a proposition h2 at the later time t2
does not imply the falsity of the conjunction h1 ∧ h2, because the interposi-
tion of a fact h1 at t1 affects the truth of h2 at t2. However, this quantum
effect should not be visible at the level of our experience. In order to restore
the symmetry of conjunction, to make it possible to extend some theorems
which would otherwise only apply to one-time histories, and to complete the
logic generally, we need the following Consistent Histories assumption:
CH Let h = Ft1(Π1) ∧ · · · ∧ Ftn(Πn) be any history in the lattice of
temporal propositions, and for any binary sequence α = (α1, . . . , αn) (αn = 0
or 1), let
hα = Ft1(Π
α1
1 ) ∧ . . . ∧ Ftn(Π
αn
n ).
where Π0 = Π, Π1 = ¬Π = 1− Π. Then
〈E0|ChαC
†
hβ
|E0〉 = 0 if α 6= β.
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where Ch is the history operator of (9).
This is part of a much wider assumption that demarcates the admissi-
ble histories in the “consistent histories” formulation of quantum mechanics
[11], and can be justified for macroscopic states like our experience states by
decoherence theory [32]. We do not need the full strength of the consistent
histories formulation.
Lemma 2. If CH holds, the truth value of a history h = Ft1(Π1) ∧ . . . ∧
Ftn(Πn) is given by
τ(h) = 〈E0|Π˜1 . . . Π˜n|E0〉. (10)
Proof. By CH, for each non-zero (α1, . . . , αn) ∈ {0, 1}
n we have
〈E0|Π˜1 · · · Π˜nΠ˜
αn
n · · · Π˜
α1
1 |E0〉 = 0. (11)
Taking αn = δir for some r gives
τ(h) = 〈E0|Π˜1 · · · Π˜nΠ˜n · · · ]Π˜r[· · · · · · Π˜n|E0〉 (12)
where ]Π˜r[ denotes that Π˜r is omitted from the product. We now prove by
downward induction on r that for any subset R = {i1, . . . , ir} of {1, . . . , n},
τ(h) = 〈E0|Π˜1 · · · Π˜nΠ˜ir . . . Π˜i1 |E0〉. (13)
Taking α so that αn = 0 if i ∈ R, αn = 1 if i /∈ R, (11) gives the right-hand
side of (13) as a sum of terms with r + k factors to the right of Π˜n, with(
n−r
k
)
terms if k > 0, all multiplied by (−1)k+1, and all equal to τ(h) by the
inductive hypothesis. This sum is∑
k 6=0
(−1)k+1
(
n− r
k
)
τ(h) = τ(h).
We can now restore symmetry to Theorems 3 and 4 and extend them to
multi-time histories.
Theorem 5. If CH holds,
τ(h1) = 0 =⇒ τ(h1 ∧ h2) = 0
for any two histories h1 and h2.
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Proof. First take h2 = Ftr(Πr) to be a one-time history and h1 to be given
by
h1 = Ft1(Π1) ∧ · · · ∧ Ftr−1(Πr−1) ∧ Ftr+1(Πr+1) ∧ · · · ∧ Ftn(Πn).
If CH holds, τ(h1 ∧ h2) is given by (12). But if τ(h1) = 0,
Π˜n · · · ]Π˜r[· · · Π˜1|E0〉 = 0
so that τ(h1 ∧ h2) = 0.
Now any h2 can be written as a conjunction of one-time histories, say
h2 = h21 ∧ · · · ∧ h2k, so
τ(h1) = 0 =⇒ τ(h1 ∧ h21) = 0 =⇒ · · · =⇒ τ(h1 ∧ h21 ∧ · · · ∧ h2k) = 0
=⇒ τ(h1 ∧ h2) = 0.
Theorem 6. If CH holds, and h2 is a one-time history,
τ(h1 ∧ h2) + τ(h1 ∧ ¬h2) = τ(h1).
Note that in general ¬h1 is a disjunction of histories, so τ(¬h1 ∧ h2) is
not yet defined.
Proof. Suppose that h1 and h2 are as in the proof of Theorem 5, so that
¬h2 = Ftr(1−Πr). Then the result follows immediately from Lemma 2.
Theorem 7. If CH holds,
τ(h1 ∧ h2) ≤ τ(h1)
for any two future histories h1, h2.
Proof. By Theorem 6, the inequality holds if h2 is a one-time history. Now
we argue by induction on the length of h2, using the associativity of ∧. If h3
is a one-time history and the inequality holds for h1 and h2,
τ(h1 ∧ h2 ∧ h3) ≤ τ(h1 ∧ h2) ≤ τ(h1)
so the inequality holds for h1 and h2 ∧ h3.
Theorem 8. If CH holds,
τ(h1) + τ(h2)− 1 ≤ τ(h1 ∧ h2)
for any two future histories h1 and h2.
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Proof. First suppose that h1 and h2 are one-time histories. By Lemma 2,
CH gives
τ(h1 ∧ h2) = 〈E0|Π˜1Π˜2Π˜1|E0〉 = 〈E0|Π˜2Π˜1|E0〉. (14)
Hence
1− τ(h1)− τ(h2) + τ(h1 ∧ h2) = 〈E0|(1− Π˜1 − Π˜2 + Π˜2Π˜1)|E0〉
= 〈E0|(1− Π˜2)(1− Π˜1)|E0〉
= τ(¬h1 ∧ ¬h2) by Lemma 2 again
≥ 0.
Now we proceed by double induction on the lengths of h1 and h2: if h3 is a
one-time history, and the inequality holds for h1 and h2, then
τ(h1) + τ(h2 ∧ h3)− 1 = τ(h1) + τ(h2)− τ(h2 ∧ ¬h3)− 1 by Theorem 8
≤ τ(h1 ∧ h2)− τ(h2 ∧ ¬h3) by the inductive hypothesis
= τ(h1 ∧ h2 ∧ h3) + τ(h1 ∧ h2 ∧ ¬h3)− τ(h1 ∧ ¬h3) by Theorem 8
≤ τ(h1 ∧ h2 ∧ h3) by Theorem 7
so the inequality holds for h1 and h2 ∧ h3. Hence, by induction it holds for
one-time h1 and any h2. Now a similar induction on h1 shows that it holds
for all h1, h2.
5.3 Disjunction
If it is clear what is meant by a future history and how to assign its truth value
in quantum theory (though whether this really is clear will be discussed in
the next section), it is not so clear how to approach a disjunction of histories.
However, with the assumption CH, which will be a standing assumption for
the remainder of this section, we can, as anticipated in section 3 (eq. (3)),
adopt the following definition from probability logic:
τ(h1 ∨ h2) = τ(h1) + τ(h2)− τ(h1 ∧ h2) (15)
since Theorems 7 and 8 assure us that this lies between 0 and 1.
We extend this to disjunctions of any finite number of future histories, i.e.
to general elements of the lattice TF, by the following definition, expressing
the principle of inclusion and exclusion:
τ(h1 ∨ · · · ∨ hn) = H
(n)
1 −H
(n)
2 + · · ·+ (−)
n−1H(n)n (16)
where
H(n)r =
∑
τ(hi1 ∧ · · · ∧ hir) (17)
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in which the sum extends over all r-subsets {i1, . . . , ir} of {1, . . . , n}. This
satisfies
τ(h1∨ · · · ∨hn) = τ(h1∨ · · ·∨hn−1)+ τ(hn)− τ
(
(h1∨ · · ·∨hn−1)∧hn
)
(18)
where, by the assumed distributivity of the lattice TF, the argument of the
last τ can be expanded into a disjunction of n − 1 histories. However, we
do not take it as an inductive definition of τ(h1 ∨ · · · ∨ hn) since it would be
necessary to show that it is well-defined, i.e. independent of the ordering of
h1, . . . , hn. We must show that the definition (16) gives a result between 0
and 1, and for this we need to extend Theorem 6:
Theorem 9. If p is any disjunction of histories and h is a one-time history,
then
τ(p) = τ(p ∧ h) + τ(p ∧ ¬h).
Proof. This is a straightforward induction on the number of disjuncts in
p.
Theorem 10. If τ(h1 ∨ · · · ∨ hn) is given by (16), then
0 ≤ τ(h1 ∨ · · · ∨ hn) ≤ 1.
Proof. This follows the same lines as the proof of Theorem 8. If hn is a
one-time history, Theorem 9 gives
τ(h1 ∨ · · · ∨ hn−1) ≥ τ
(
(h1 ∨ · · · ∨ hn−1) ∧ hn
)
and arguing by induction on the length of hn, as in Theorem 7, we can extend
this to general hn. Hence, by (18),
τ(h1 ∨ · · · ∨ hn) ≥ τ(hn) ≥ 0.
For the right-hand inequality, first suppose that h1, . . . , hn are one-time
histories, with τ(hn) = 〈E0|Π˜n|E0〉; then in the definition (16) we have, from
Lemma 2,
H(n)r =
∑
〈E0|Π˜i1 . . . Π˜in |E0〉
and therefore
τ(h1 ∨ · · · ∨ hn) = 1− 〈E0|(1− Π˜n)(1− Π˜n−1) · · · (1− Π˜1)|E0〉
= 1− τ(¬h1 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬hn)
. Since ¬h1 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬hn is a single history, this lies between 0 and 1.
The right-hand inequality can be extended to arbitrary histories h1, . . . , hn
by a similar argument to the last part of the proof of Theorem 8, using suc-
cessive inductions on the lengths of h1, . . . , hn.
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We can show that (15) is true in general. This is the replacement for the
truth table for ∨ in truth-functional many-valued logic.
Theorem 11. If p and q are any two future propositions (elements of the
lattice TF),
τ(p ∨ q) = τ(p) + τ(q)− τ(p ∧ q).
Proof. Suppose p = h1 ∨ · · · ∨ hm and q = k1 ∨ · · · ∨ kn where hn and kj are
histories. The definition (16) gives expressions for τ(p), τ(q), τ(p ∨ q) and
τ(p ∧ q) which can be rewritten in a factorised form as follows.
For any set X , we write 2X for the set of subsets of X , as usual. Let
U(X) be the commutative ring generated by the subsets of X with union as
the ring multiplication (in other words, U(X) is a Z-module with basis 2X ,
with the additional operation of union defined on the basis and extended by
Z-linearity). We continue to use the symbol ∪ for this extended operation.
Then the empty set is a multiplicative identity in U(X), and we will denote
it by 1.
Let M = {1, . . . , m} and N = {1, . . . , n}. Let M ⊔ N be the disjoint
union of M and N , realised as
M ⊔N = {(1, 0), . . . , (m, 0), (0, 1), . . . , (0, n)} ⊂ Z× Z
(so M ⊔N is the union of the projections of M ×N onto the axes in Z×Z).
Define real-valued functions τp : 2
M → [0, 1], τq : 2
N → [0, 1], τp∨q : 2
M⊔N →
[0, 1] and τp∧q : 2
M×N → [0, 1] by
τp({i1, . . . , ir}) = τ(hi1 ∨ · · · ∨ hir),
τq({j1, . . . , js}) = τ(kj1 ∨ · · · ∨ kjs),
τp∨q
(
{(i1, 0) . . . , (ir, 0), (0, j1), . . . , (0, js)}
)
= τ
(
hi1 ∨ · · · ∨ hir ∨ kj1 ∨ · · · ∨ kjs
)
,
τp∧q
(
{(i1, j1), . . . , (it, jt)}
)
= τ
(
hi1 ∨ kj1 ∨ · · · ∨ hit ∨ kjt
)
.
Then the definition (16) can be stated as
τ(p) = τp
(
1− (1− {1}) ∪ · · · ∪ (1− {m})
)
with corresponding expressions for τ(q), τ(p ∨ q) and τ(p ∧ q). To write
the last two, it is convenient to introduce the abbreviations en = {(i, 0)},
fj = {(0, j)} and gij = {(i, j)} for the singleton sets in 2
M⊔N and 2M×N ,
which generate the rings U(M ⊔N) and U(M ×N). Then
τ(p ∨ q) = τp∨q
(
1− (1− e1) ∪ . . . ∪ (1− em) ∪ (1− f1) ∪ · · · ∪ (i− fn)
)
,
τ(p ∧ q) = τp∨q
(
1−
⋃
ij
(1− gij)
)
.
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Define a map f : 2M×N → 2M⊔N by projecting M ×N ⊂ Z× Z onto the
axes:
f
(
{(i1, j1), . . . (ir, jr)}
)
= {i1, . . . , ir} ⊔ {j1, . . . , jr}
= {(i1, 0), . . . , (ir, 0), (0, j1), . . . , (0, jr)}.
This satisfies f(S ∪ T ) = f(S) ∪ f(T ) and therefore can be extended to a
ring homomorphism f : U(M ×N)→ U(M ⊔N). It is completely specified
by its action on the generators:
f(gij) = en ∪ fj . (19)
Now let S = {(i1, j1), . . . , (ir, jr)} be any subset of M ×N . Then
τp∧q(S) = τ (hi1 ∨ kj1 ∨ · · · ∨ hir ∨ kjr)
= τ (hi1 ∨ · · · ∨ hir ∨ kj1 ∨ · · · ∨ kjr)
= τp∨q (ei1 ∪ · · · ∪ eir ∪ fi1 ∪ · · · ∪ fjr)
= τp∨q(f(S)),
so τp∧q = τp∨q ◦ f . Hence
τ(p ∧ q) = τp∧q
(
1−
⋃
ij
(1− gij)
)
= τp∨q ◦ f
(
1−
⋃
ij
(1− gij)
)
= τp∨q
(
1−
⋃
ij
(1− en ∪ fj)
)
.
We now note that for any e, f1, . . . , fn ∈ U(M ⊔ N) satisfying e ∪ e = e,
in particular if e is one of the generators of U(M ⊔N),
n⋃
j=1
(1− e ∪ fj) = 1− e+ e ∪
n⋃
j=1
(1− fj).
which can be proved by a simple induction on n. Hence
⋃
ij
(1− en ∪ fj) =
m⋃
i=1
(1− en + en ∪ F )
where
F =
n⋃
j=1
(1− fj).
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Note that (1− fn) ∪ (1 − fn) = 1 − fn, so F ∪ F = F . Induction on m can
now be used to show that
m⋃
i=1
(1− en + en ∪ F ) = E + F − E ∪ F
where
E =
m⋃
i=1
(1− en).
We now have
τ(p ∧ q) = τp∨q(1− E − F + E ∪ F )
= τp∨q(1− E) + τp∨q(1− F )− τp∨q(1− E ∪ F ). (20)
But
τp∨q(1−E) = τp∨q
(
1−
m⋃
i=1
(1− {i, 0})
)
= τp
(
1−
m⋃
i=1
(1− {i})
)
= τ(p),
and similarly
τp∨q(1− F ) = τ(q), τp∨q(1−E ∪ F ) = τ(p ∨ q).
Eq. (20) therefore gives the stated result.
5.4 Negation
For a one-time history h = Ft(Π), negation is defined by the usual ortho-
complement in the lattice of closed subspaces of Hilbert space:
¬h = Ft(1−Π)
with truth value
τ(¬h) = 1− τ(h). (21)
For a general history h = h1 ∧ · · · ∧ hr where hn are one-time histories, we
take negation to be given by
¬h = ¬h1 ∨ · · · ∨ ¬hr,
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and for a general proposition p = k1 ∨ · · · ∨ kr, where kn are multi-time
histories,
¬p = ¬k1 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬kr.
The truth values of such general h and p are aleady covered by the definition
in the previous section. Our aim in this subsection is to prove that (21) still
holds.
Lemma 3. If h1 and h2 are any two histories,
τ(h1) = τ(h1 ∧ h2) + τ(h1 ∧ ¬h2)
Proof. By induction on the length of h2. By Theorem 6, the theorem holds
for all h1 and all one-time histories h2. Suppose it holds for all h2 of length
n, and let h′2 be a history of length n+1, so h
′
2 = h2∧h3 where h2 has length
n and h3 has length 1. Then
τ(h1 ∧ h
′
2) + τ(h1 ∧ ¬h
′
2) = τ(h1 ∧ h2 ∧ h3) + τ
(
h1 ∧ (¬h2 ∨ ¬h3)
)
= τ(h1 ∧ h2 ∧ h3) + τ
(
(h1 ∧ ¬h2) ∨ (h1 ∧ ¬h3)
)
= τ(h1 ∧ h2 ∧ h3) + τ(h1 ∧ ¬h2) + τ(h1 ∧ ¬h3)
− τ(h1 ∧ ¬h2 ∧ ¬h3)
= τ(h1 ∧ h2 ∧ h3) + τ(h1 ∧ ¬h2 ∧ h3) + τ(h1 ∧ ¬h3)
by Theorem 6
= τ(h1 ∧ h3) + τ(h1 ∧ ¬h3)
by the inductive hypothesis
= τ(h1) by Theorem 6 again.
Lemma 4. If h is any history,
τ(¬h) = 1− τ(h)
Proof. By induction on the length of h. Suppose the result holds for all
histories of length n, and let h′ be a history of length n+1, so that h′ = h0∧h
where h0 is a one-time history and h has length n. Then
τ(¬h) = τ(¬h0 ∨ ¬h
′)
= τ(¬h0) + τ(¬h)− τ(¬h0 ∧ ¬h).
But τ(¬h) = 1− τ(h) by the inductive hypothesis, and
τ(¬h0)− τ(¬h0 ∧ ¬h) = τ(¬h0 ∧ h) by Theorem 3,
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so
τ(¬h′) = 1− τ(h) + τ(¬h0 ∧ h)
= 1− τ(h0 ∧ h) by Theorem 6
= 1− τ(h′).
The result holds for n = 1 by (21), and therefore holds for all n.
Theorem 12. If p is any disjunction of histories,
τ(¬p) = 1− τ(p)
Proof. By induction on the number of disjoined histories in p. Suppose the
theorem holds for all p = h1 ∨ · · · ∨ hn, and let p
′ = p∨ k where k is another
history. Then
τ(¬p′) = τ(¬p ∧ ¬k)
= τ(¬p) + τ(¬k)− τ(¬p ∨ ¬k)
= τ(¬p) + τ(¬k)− τ
(
¬(p ∧ k)
)
= 1− τ(p) + 1− τ(k)− [1− τ(p ∧ k)]
by the inductive hypothesis, since p ∧ k is also a conjunction of n histories
hn ∧ k. Hence
τ(¬p′) = 1− τ(p ∨ k) = 1− τ(p′)
and the theorem is established for all p by induction.
A similar double induction can be used to prove the general version of
Theorem 6:
Theorem 13. If p and q are any two elements of the lattice TF,
τ(p) = τ(p ∧ q) + τ(p ∧ ¬q).
We can now state the general logical properties of conjunction and dis-
junction in this temporal logic:
Theorem 14. Let p and q be any two temporal propositions.
(i) τ(p ∧ q) = 1 ⇐⇒ τ(p) = τ(q) = 1;
(ii) τ(p) = 0 or τ(q) = 0 =⇒ τ(p ∧ q) = 0;
(iii) τ(p ∨ q) = 0 ⇐⇒ τ(p) = τ(q) = 0;
(iv) τ(p) = 1 or τ(q) = 1 =⇒ τ(p ∨ q) = 1.
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Proof. (i) If τ(p ∧ q) = 1, then, by Theorem 13,
τ(p) = τ(p ∧ q) + τ(p ∧ ¬q) ≥ 1
and therefore τ(p) = 1. Conversely, if τ(p) = τ(q) = 1, then
τ(p ∧ q) = τ(p) + τ(q)− τ(p ∨ q) ≥ 1
and therefore τ(p ∧ q) = 1.
(ii) If τ(p) = 0, then
τ(p ∧ q) = τ(p) + τ(q)− τ(p ∨ q)
= τ
(
¬(p ∨ q)
)
− τ(¬q)
= τ(¬p ∧ ¬q)− τ(¬q)
= −τ(¬q ∧ p) by Theorem 13
≤ 0,
so τ(p ∧ q) = 0.
(iii) and (iv) follow from these by writing τ(p ∨ q) = 1− τ(¬p ∧ ¬q).
A possibly disturbing feature of this list of properties is the one-sidedness
of the implications (ii) and (iv): p ∧ q might be false without either p or q
being false (though (i) shows that if p∧ q is not definitely true, then p and q
cannot both be definitely true); and the truth of p∨q does not imply the truth
of either p or q (though (iii) shows that this implication does hold if “truth”
(τ = 1) is replaced by “possible truth” (τ 6= 0)). The first of these has
already been discussed, but the second, concerning truth rather than falsity,
might be felt to cast doubt on whether ∨ can legitimately be regarded as a
generalised form of “or” (a similar objection has been made to quantum logic
[29]). Such an objection would be an argument against any identification of
probabilities with truth values. However, far from being objectionable, this
feature of disjunction seems to be necessary in a temporal logic that can
deal with indeterminism. As Prior noted ([21] p.244), Aristotle’s assertion
“Either there will be a sea-battle tomorrow or there won’t” should be taken
to mean, not what it appears to mean, but “ ‘Either “There is a sea-battle
going on” or “there is no sea-battle going on” ’ will be true tomorrow”; in
symbols,
By Ft(p) ∨ Ft(¬p) Aristotle meant Ft(p ∨ ¬p).
But in the logic proposed here Ft is taken to be a homorphism, so that
Ft(p) ∨ Ft(q) = Ft(p ∨ q),
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showing that the meaning of the connective ∨ in this system is in accordance
with Prior’s reading of Aristotle. Aristotle’s usage (or confusion, if that is
what it is) is of course very common. I take Prior’s elucidation of it as
grounds for claiming that the disjunction ∨ occurring in this temporal logic
is in fact the “or” of common usage in talk about the open future.
6 Retrospect
In this final section I will consider to what extent the proposals in this paper
meet the objectives set out in Section 2.
The open future The reader may well have observed that there is nothing
new or specifically quantum-mechanical about the indeterministic world of
experiences which emerges from quantum mechanics, as described in Section
2; this is the classical picture of an open future. The assumption CH in
Section 4.2 simply ensures the classical nature of our logic. Thus the logic
developed here is a temporal logic appropriate to a metaphysics of time that
incorporates an open future. It can be summarised as follows:
1. The lattice T of tensed (and dated) propositions is formed from
a lattice E of tenseless propositions by means of lattice homomorphisms
{Pt, N, Ft : t ∈ R, t > 0} whose images generate T .
2. A set of truth values is a map τ : E → R satisfying
(i) 0 ≤ τ(p) ≤ 1;
(ii) τ(p) = 0 or 1 if p belongs to N(E) or Pt(E);
(iii) τ(p ∧ q) + τ(p ∨ q) = τ(p) + τ(q);
(iv) τ(p ∧ q) ≤ τ(p), τ(q) ≤ τ(p ∨ q).
The logic based on these axioms will be discussed elsewhere.
Strictly Quantum The reader may also have observed that I have not
kept to the faith boldly proclaimed in Section 2. I there renounced the devil
and all his works, such as the collapse postulate, and his pomps, such as
a separate classical realm. But the formula I took for the truth value (or
probability) of a history is taken from a calculation of probability based
on the collapse postulate; and the Consistent Histories assumption, which I
introduced in order to get a recognisable logic, is just a way of eliminating
the characteristic features of quantum mechanics. This assumption can be
justified by decoherence theory within quantum mechanics, but only if one
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restricts the set of possible histories (for example, it will not be true if one
wants to include times that are arbitrarily close to each other). Moreover,
there is no justification for the definite past propositions Pt(p); there is no
thin red line between experience states going into the past, any more than
there is one going into the future. There are only statements taken from
present memory, which are aspects of the present experience states (in other
words, statements about the past can only be in the perfect tense – which is
one of the three aspects of the present tense in English [14]).
These objections can be met by restricting the logic as follows. The
present sublattice N(E) describes present experience, including memory (so
statements about the past occur in the perfect tense as elements of N(E)).
From the context of a particular experience state η0, these elements of N(E)
have truth values restricted to {0, 1}. It is possible to make future-tense
statements only about experiences at one future time. A statement about a
future history must be regarded as an element of Ftf(E), where tf is the last
time in the history; the other elements of the history are in the future perfect
tense, referring to the contents of memory at time tf (this, after all, is the
only way we can verify a statement referring to a number of future times: we
wait until the last time referred to and then consult records of earlier times).
In this austere approach, the set of propositions is not a lattice but is the
union of the sublattices N(E) and Ft(E) for all positive real numbers t. A
conjunction or disjunction of elements of different sublattices is not a well-
formed proposition in this logic. However, it can be regarded as a statement
in the metalanguage, with the usual bivalent truth values: if e and f are
experience statements, so that Fs(e) and Ft(f) are statements in the future
tense, then the disjunction Fs(e)∨Ft(f) means, as usual, that one of the two
propositions is (definitely) true, i.e. “either τ(Fs(e)) = 1 or τ(Ft(f)) = 1”.
7 Conclusion
In this paper I have proposed a way to understand the statements about
the future made by a sentient physical system in a universe described by
quantum theory. I take it that we are such sentient physical systems, living
in such a universe. The proposal is that the statements any one of us can
make, from his or her own perspective in the universe, form a lattice with
the usual logical operations of conjunction, disjunction and negation obeying
conventional laws, but that the appropriate truth values for such statements
(or “histories”) are many-valued, with values in the unit interval [0, 1] of real
numbers, and are to be identified with probabilities. The paper has explored
the logical properties of the truth values given by quantum theory, delineat-
28
ing which of these properties require the special assumption of “consistent
histories”. We find that this assumption is sufficient to prove all the log-
ical properties to be expected from the identification of truth values with
probabilities.
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